










Some Reflections on the Unlimited 
Jurisdiction of the EU Courts to Review 








Article 261 TFEU allows the Union Legislature to make regulations giving the Court of 
Justice
2
 unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties provided for therein. The 
Legislature has availed of this facility on a number of different occasions:
3
 the best 
known and most frequently discussed being that provided for by Article 31 of 
Regulation 1/2003. This confers unlimited jurisdiction on the EU Courts to review 
decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment, thus 
permitting them to cancel, reduce or increase such penalties.
4
 The EU Courts may alter 
a fine imposed by the Commission: they do not substitute it for a new penalty. As a 
consequence, the judgment of the EU Courts on such a review has no legal 
consequences for the scope of any guarantee or arrangement the applicant may have 
                                                          
*  Judge , General Court of the EU 
1  This contribution, submitted in a purely personal capacity, began life as an address to the inaugural Annual 
Conference on EU law organized by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute of Legal Studies (Magyar 
Tudományos Akadémia Társadalomtudományi Kutatóközpont (MTA TK)) on the topic “Between the State and 
Competition in the Single Market” at the Council Chamber, Faculty of Law, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, 
on November 6, 2015. I wish to thank in particular Dr. Márton Varju, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Social 
Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Dr. Tihamér Tóth, Associate Professor, Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University, Budapest for their invitation, warm welcome and invaluable assistance. I also wish to thank Mr. 
Olivier Speltdoorn and Ms. Emma-Jean Hinchy, référendaires attached to my chambers, for their useful comments 
on the final draft of this paper. Any errors are entirely my responsibility.  
2  As EU institution: however the Court of Justice at present consists of three courts: the Court of Justice, the General 
Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. The General Court was known as the Court of First Instance prior to the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Henceforth I shall refer to the courts collectively as “EU Courts” and use 
the name of an individual court where necessary.  
3  See the list in Arabadjiev, “Unlimited Jurisdiction: What Does it Mean today?” in Cardonnel, Rosas & Wahl, 
“Constitutionalising the EU Judicial System”, Hart Publishing 2012, p. 391. 
4  And see Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and 
C‑254/99 P, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v Commission, EU:C:2002:582, paragraph 692. 
ANTHONY MICHAEL COLLINS 
   
 
126 




The grant of an unlimited jurisdiction to review fines imposed by a decision leaves 
quite a number of issues to be decided by the EU Courts. Moreover the exercise of this 
jurisdiction obliges the EU Courts to assess matters well beyond the more familiar 
terrain of adjudicating on the legality of measures or interpreting provisions of EU law. 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the development of this jurisdiction has been 
somewhat uneven. In the course of this contribution in honour of my colleague and 
friend Judge Otto Czúcz I propose to examine three of these issues: the judicial 
character of unlimited jurisdiction and its consequences for litigants; the autonomous 
character of unlimited jurisdiction and its relationship to the action for annulment and 
the rationale upon which the EU Courts may have recourse to the Commission’s Fining 
Guidelines
6




The Judicial Character of Unlimited Jurisdiction  
 
Almost all applications seeking to invoke exercise of the EU Courts’ unlimited 
jurisdiction aim at the reduction or the cancellation of a fine or penalty imposed by the 
Commission. In KME
7
, the Commission counterclaimed for an increase in the fine that 
it had imposed on the ground that the applicant had, in the course of the court 
proceedings, put in issue certain facts that had been uncontested throughout the 
administrative procedure. The General Court dismissed the Commission’s application 
as unfounded. It follows that the EU Courts may entertain an application to increase a 
fine in the exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction.
8
  
The power to cancel, reduce or increase a fine (as distinct from adjudicating upon its 
validity) is an integral and necessary component of the “full jurisdiction” that must be 
vested in a judicial organ so as to permit the judicial review of a penalty imposed by an 
administrative body to satisfy the requirements of Article 6.1 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In Menarini the European Court of Human Rights had 
little difficulty in finding that the imposition of a €6M fine by the Italian Competition 
Authority was penal in nature, thereby attracting the application of the criminal limb of 
Article 6.1 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
9
 The requirements of that 
provision could be met by a procedure that gave an administrative authority the power 
to first impose a “penalty”, provided that where the procedures before that authority did 
not meet all of the requirements of Article 6.1, the decision to impose that penalty could 
                                                          
5  Case T-275/94, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires "CB" v Commission, EU:T:1995:141, paragraphs 57 to 60. 
6  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003 (2006/C 
210/02) O.J. 2006 C 210, p.2, hereafter “Fining Guidelines”. 
7  Case T-127/04, KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v Commission, EU:T:2009:142, 
paragraphs 25, 30, 37 and 52–53. 
8  Case C-301/04 P, Commission v SGL Carbon AG, EU:C:2006:432, paragraphs 66 - 70 is an example of a 
successful application by the Commission. 
9  Appn. No. 43509/08, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy ECHR:2011:0927JUD004350908, paragraphs 38–44. 
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be challenged before a judicial organ exercising full jurisdiction. For a judicial organ to 
enjoy such full jurisdiction it had to be capable of changing every facet of a decision, in 
fact and in law and, in particular, to have the power to rule upon all relevant questions 
of fact and law brought to its attention.
10
  Applying this approach to the facts before it, 
the European Court of Human Rights observed that the administrative court’s 
jurisdiction over competition authority decisions was not limited to verifying their 
legality but allowed it to decide whether, in the light of the particular circumstances of 
the case, the competition authority had exercised its powers in an appropriate manner, 
notably with regard to the merits and proportionality of the choices it had made, 
including assessments of a technical character.
11
 
The Court of Justice has since asserted that, for so long as the EU has not acceded to 
the European Convention on Human Rights it is not “formally incorporated into EU 
law”.
12
 Nevertheless, the TFEU respects the principle of effective judicial protection, 
now consecrated in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union
13
 through the conferral of unlimited jurisdiction on the EU Courts, which 
empowers them to substitute their own appraisal for that made by the Commission and 
to cancel, reduce or increase a fine or periodic penalty payment imposed thereby. In the 
opinion of the Court of Justice that conferral of unlimited jurisdiction meets the 
requirements of Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights as described 
by the European Court of Human Rights in Menarini.
14
  
Inherent in this approach is that unlimited jurisdiction is an exercise of the judicial 
power, by the judicial arm of government. This conclusion also appears to follow from 
the Court of Justice’s judgment in Chalkor,
15
 where it pointed out that, save for certain 
pleas derived from considerations of public policy that the Courts are required to raise 
of their own motion, such as the failure to state reasons for a decision, proceedings 
before the EU Courts are inter partes. In order to invoke the unlimited jurisdiction of 
the EU Courts an applicant must accordingly raise pleas in law to challenge the decision 
it seeks to impugn and adduce evidence in support of those pleas. To this end, the 
applicant must identify the impugned elements of the contested decision, formulate 
grounds of challenge thereto and adduce direct or circumstantial evidence to 
demonstrate that its objections are well founded. Of considerable importance in this 
regard is the recognition that although the General Court is under a duty to examine all 
complaints based on issues of law and fact that seek to show that the amount of the fine 
is not commensurate with the gravity or the duration of the infringement, unlimited 
jurisdiction does not oblige it to undertake a fresh or comprehensive review of the 
decision of its own motion.
16
  
                                                          
10  Appn. No. 43509/08, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy ECHR:2011:0927JUD004350908, paragraph 59. 
11  Appn. No. 43509/08, A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v Italy ECHR:2011:0927JUD004350908, paragraph 64. 
12  Case C-571/10, Kamberaj v IPES, EU:C:2012:233, paragraph 62; Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Åkerberg 
Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, paragraph 44. 
13  Henceforth “Charter”.  
14  Case C-510/11 P, Kone Oyj v Commission, EU:C:2013:696, paragraphs 22–25. 
15  Case C‑386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission, EU:C:2011:815, paragraphs 63–66. 
16  Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 213, 
applying Case C‑386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission, EU:C:2011:815, paragraph 64 and 
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If unlimited jurisdiction involves the exercise of powers of a judicial character, there 
appears to be no reason why, as indeed Chalkor appears to hold, the usual procedures 
applicable to inter parties litigation ought not to apply in proceedings of this type. 
Indeed it may be argued that unlimited jurisdiction consists in determining the law 
applicable, finding disputed facts and assessing the penalty to be imposed in the light of 
such determinations and findings. The character of that exercise is immediately 
recognizable as similar to that conducted by a criminal court.
17
 Moreover, the fact that 
the EU system for the enforcement of competition law contemplates the exercise of 
investigative, prosecutorial and quasi-judicial powers the Commission does not alter the 
nature of those powers being so exercised. 
If the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction has an unequivocally judicial character, the 
question arises as to whether the EU Courts can increase a fine in the absence of an 
application for that purpose. In Groupe Danone
18
, an appeal against a fine of €44.043M, 
the Court of First Instance found that the Commission had incorrectly taken account of 
an element in its assessment of aggravating circumstances. It thus reduced the 
percentage increase in the fine for this reason to 40% from 50%: however, it did so by 
means of a different formula to that which the Commission had used. As a consequence, 
the Court of First Instance reduced the fine by a sum of €1.305M less than would have 
been the case had it used the Commission’s formula. 
The applicant appealed against this aspect of the Court of First Instance’s judgment 
on two grounds. First, it asserted that the Court of First Instance had breached the ne 
ultra petita rule, whereby it was limited to ruling upon the case as had been made out 
before it. Second, it claimed the Court of First Instance had failed to respect the right to 
be heard by adjudicating upon this issue without having afforded it an opportunity to 
make submissions thereon. 
In his Opinion, Advocate General Poiares Maduro first observed that unlimited 
jurisdiction gives a power to the EU Courts to sit in the Commission’s shoes and to 
replace the Commission’s assessment of facts with its own. The nature of this exercise 
is of a significantly different order to that of interpreting laws and reviewing the legality 
of measures usually carried out by the EU Courts.  
Addressing the applicant’s first plea, Advocate General Poiares Maduro thus took 
the view that, since the ne ultra petita rule was a restriction on the exercise of judicial 
power, it had a limited role to play in circumstances where the EU Courts were required 
to discharge what was a quasi-administrative, rather than a purely judicial, function. 
Accordingly, the application of the ne ultra petita rule in the exercise of unlimited 
jurisdiction was limited to preventing the EU Courts from reviewing a fine in the 
absence of any request having been made for that purpose. Once such a request had 
                                                                                                                                              
Case C-389/10 P KME Germany v Commission EU:C:2011:816, paragraph 131. See also Case C-510/11 P, Kone 
Oyj v Commission, EU:C:2013:696, paragraphs 30–32. 
17  The power to impose penalties, including imprisonment, for breaches of competition law in Australia, Canada, 
Ireland and the United States of America is reserved to the Courts. For examples see Banks & Jalabert-Doury, 
“Competition Law Compliance Programmes and Government Support and Indifference” Concurrences No. 2 – 
2012. See also Forrester, A Challenge for Europe’s Judges: the Review of Fines in Competition Cases (2011) 
European Law Review, pp. 199–203. 
18  Case C-3/06 P, Groupe Danone v Commission, EU:C:2006:720. 
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been made, even where that request was limited to seeking a reduction of the fine, the 
matter of the fine was properly before the EU Courts, which could then increase it in the 
exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance could recalculate a 
fine by recourse to a method that was less favourable to a party than that envisaged by 
the scope of its argument seeking a reduction of that penalty.
19
 
The judgment of the Court of Justice simply states that because the EU Courts can 
exercise unlimited jurisdiction where the amount of the fine is raised before them they 
may reduce or increase the amount at issue.
20
 This statement does not seem to 
distinguish between the existence of a power (to increase a fine, which is not at issue) 
and the circumstances in which that power may be exercised (where it has not been 
raised by one of the parties to the litigation, the core issue in Groupe Danone). Absent 
this analysis, it may be surmised that the Court of Justice followed the approach 
suggested by Advocate General Poiares Maduro. Since then the EU Courts have, on a 
number of occasions, followed the approach in Groupe Danone and have increased 
fines in the exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction, notwithstanding the absence of an 
application to that end.
21
  
It is suggested such an approach is inconsistent with the idea that unlimited 
jurisdiction constitutes an exercise of judicial power. Moreover no argument has been 
advanced as to why the ne ultra petita rule ought not to apply to proceedings invoking 
unlimited jurisdiction in the same way as it applies in any other litigation. The Court of 
Justice has since held that, under the rules governing the procedure before the EU 
Courts, notably Article 21 of the Statute of the Court and Article 44(1) (now Article 76) 
of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, disputes are determined and 
circumscribed by the parties, the EU Courts may not rule ultra petita and pleas going to 
the substantive legality of a decision can be examined only where they are raised by the 
applicant.
22
  Since the EU Courts appear bound to exercise unlimited jurisdiction within 
the framework of the case advanced on the parties’ behalf it is difficult to understand 
how they could increase the amount of a fine absent an application duly made before 




The autonomous character of unlimited jurisdiction 
 
The Court of Justice has repeatedly observed that the review of the legality of decisions 
under Article 263 TFEU is “supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction in respect of the 
amount of the fine, provided for under Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003”.
23
 This 
                                                          
19  Case C-3/06 P, Groupe Danone v Commission, EU:C:2006:720, Opinion of Poiares Maduro AG, paragraphs 47–
49. 
20  Case C-3/06 P, Groupe Danone v Commission, EU:C:2007:88, paragraphs 60 - 62. 
21  Joined Cases T-101/05 and T-111/05, BASF AG and UCB SA v Commission, EU:T:2007:380, paragraphs 213–
220. 
22  Case C‑272/12 P, Commission v Ireland, EU:C:2013:812, paragraphs 27 – 28. 
23  Case C-510/11 P Kone Oyj v Commission, EU:C:2013:696, paragraph 25, referring to Case C-501/11 P, Schindler 
Holding v Commission, EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 38; Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany AG v Commission, 
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statement accurately describes the procedural position. The applicant in FNICGV v 
Commission
24
 sought to bring proceedings under Article 229 EC, the precursor of 
Article 261 TFEU. This choice of remedy was possibly motivated by the fact that the 
time-limit of two months and ten days within which to commence proceedings under 
the fifth paragraph of Article 230 EC (now the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU) 
applied exclusively to actions under Article 230 EC. Dismissing the action by reasoned 
order, the Court of First Instance referred to Article 225(1) EC (now Article 256 TFEU), 
which adumbrates its jurisdiction without referring to Article 261 TFEU. The Court of 
First Instance interpreted this silence to mean that the unlimited jurisdiction conferred 
upon it by regulations made under Article 229 EC fell to be 
 
“…exercised by the Community judicature only in the context of the review of acts 
of the Community institutions, more particularly in actions for annulment. The sole 
effect of Article 229 EC is to enlarge the extent of the powers the Community judicature 
has in the context of the action referred to in Article 230 EC. Consequently, an action in 
which the Community judicature is asked to exercise its unlimited jurisdiction with 
respect to a decision imposing a penalty necessarily comprises or includes a request for 
the annulment, in whole or in part, of that decision. Such an action must therefore be 





There was no appeal against that order. The General Court confirmed this analysis in 




This approach has the merit of ensuring that applications requesting the General 
Court to exercise its jurisdiction to review penalties are brought expeditiously and in 
tandem with any application to amend part or all of a decision imposing same. 
Moreover, the operation of such time limits does not appear to impede an applicant 
from asking the General Court to review a finding by the Commission concerning its 
ability to pay a fine or penalty by reference to facts that occurred between the adoption 
of decision under challenge and the delivery of judgment. 
However if Article 261 TFEU enlarges the EU Courts’ jurisdiction to review 
penalties in the context of an annulment action, it seems to follow that, at the very least, 
those courts must have such an application before them in order to exercise unlimited 
jurisdiction. Ought it to be sufficient to bring an annulment action, even one that is 
doomed to fail, in order to be able to invoke the EU Courts’ unlimited jurisdiction? By 
looking to the form rather than to the substance such a requirement appears close to 
imposing a purely procedural formality, which approach EU law usually abhors. Or 
does this case law hint at a requirement of a more substantial character, whereby the EU 
Courts must be at least in a position to annul all or part of the decision before they can 
                                                                                                                                              
EU:T:2009:142, paragraph 106; Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon, EU:C:2011:815, 
paragraph 67, and Case C-199/11, Otis e.a. v Commission, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 63. 
24 Case T-252/03, FNICGV v Commission, EU:T:2004:326. 
25 Case T-252/03, FNICGV v Commission, EU:T:2004:326, paragraph 25. 
26 Case T‑132/07, Fuji Electric Co. Ltd v Commission, EU:T:2011:344, paragraphs 206 –207. 
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exercise unlimited jurisdiction? Does the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction depend upon 
the decision under review containing an error capable of justifying annulment? Is it 
sufficient for the General Court to find that the Commission made an error short of 
amounting to such an illegality? Or can the General Court review a decision imposing a 
penalty without concluding that the decision contains an error?  
Consideration of this issue first requires a closer look at the terms by which the 
TFEU confers unlimited jurisdiction on the EU Courts. Article 261 TFEU states that 
regulations may give the EU Courts unlimited jurisdiction with regard to the penalties 
therein provided for. It is thus at least arguable that the text of the TFEU presents no 
obstacle to the Union Legislature conferring an autonomous jurisdiction to review 
penalties on the EU Courts. Moreover Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 speaks of the EU 
Courts’ “unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions whereby the Commission has fixed a 
fine or periodic penalty payment.” The provision that in fact confers unlimited 
jurisdiction is thus silent as to whether it supplements, or is independent of, the action 
for annulment.   
An answer to these questions must also take account of considerations of a systemic 
character, notably the necessity to render the mechanism for penalising breaches of EU 
competition rules compatible with the rights protected by the Charter.
27
 Article 47 of the 
Charter declares that everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are 
violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal. Moreover, Article 49.3 of 
the Charter provides that the severity of penalties must not be disproportionate to the 
offence. Thus Advocate General Wathelet has opined that the unlimited jurisdiction to 
review Commission decisions imposing fines in competition matters requires the EU 
Courts to make their own assessments and “…entails the power to quash in all respects, 
on questions of fact and law, the decision adopted and the jurisdiction to examine all 




Adopting a similar approach, the Court of Justice concluded that:  
 
“…in order to satisfy the requirements of conducting a review exercising its powers 
of unlimited jurisdiction for the purpose of Article 47 of the Charter with regard to the 
fine, the EU judicature is bound, in the exercise of the powers conferred by Articles 261 
TFEU and 263 TFEU, to examine all complaints based on issues of fact and law which 
seek to show that the amount of the fine is not commensurate with the gravity or the 
duration of the infringement.”
29
 
                                                          
27  See the examples referred to in Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, 
EU:C:2013:619, Opinion of Wathelet AG, paragraph 143. See also Forrester, pp. 185–189. 
28  Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, EU:C:2013:619, Opinion of 
Wathelet AG, paragraphs 109 – 110 and paragraph 204 of the judgment of the Court of Justice, which 
expressly refers to whether the exercise carried out by the General Court under its unlimited jurisdiction has 
complied with Article 47 of the Charter. See also Case C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding v Commission, 
EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 35. 
29  Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, EU:C:2014:2062, paragraph 
200. See also Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v Commission, EU:C:2011:815, paragraph 
51; Case C-199/11, Otis v Commission, EU:C:2012:684, paragraph 47 and Case C-501/11 P, Schindler 
Holding v Commission, EU:C:2013:522, paragraph 36. 
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The Court of Justice merges the twin sources of the EU Courts’ unlimited 
jurisdiction in this passage, thereby avoiding an analysis of the precise content and 
scope of its individual parts.  Indeed the case-law of the Court of Justice on this point 
has not always presented a picture of consistency. On occasion it has favoured an 
interpretation whereby the EU Courts are vested with two independent jurisdictions, 
each with their own individual characteristics, rather than with an unlimited jurisdiction 
that, even impliedly, is supplemental to the action for annulment. For instance in SCA 
Holding Ltd.
30
 the Court of Justice identified two sources of jurisdiction over actions 
challenging Commission decisions to impose fines for breaches of competition law. 
First, a power of review by reference to grounds for annulment in Article 263 TFEU. 
Second, an assessment of the appropriateness of size of any penalties imposed in the 
exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction. That the scope of the latter review was wider than 
the first could be gleaned from the observation that the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction 
might justify the production, and taking into account, of information that did not have to 
appear in the decision by reason of the duty to state reasons. In Prym the Court of 
Justice adopted a similar approach, holding that: 
 
“As regards the review carried out by the Community judicature in respect of 
Commission decisions on competition matters, it should be borne in mind that, more 
than a simple review of legality, which merely permits dismissal of the action for 
annulment or annulment of the contested measure, the unlimited jurisdiction conferred 
on the Court of First Instance by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003 in accordance with 
Article 229 EC authorises that court to vary the contested measure, even without 
annulling it, by taking into account all of the factual circumstances, so as to amend, for 
example, the amount of the fine (Joined Cases C‑238/99 P, C‑244/99 P, C‑245/99 P, 
C‑247/99 P, C‑250/99 P to C‑252/99 P and C‑254/99 P Limburgse Vinyl 





In Prym the Court of Justice examined how the Court of First Instance had exercised 
these distinct powers of review. It approved of the Court of First Instance taking into 
account the defect it had identified and considering its impact upon the amount of the 
fine in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction.
32
 This seems to imply that, in the 
exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction, EU Courts may take into account defects that 
would not justify the annulment of the decision under review but which could have an 
impact upon the level of the penalty at issue. Indeed although nothing in the applicable 
provisions expressly requires the presence of an irregularity in order to exercise 
unlimited jurisdiction, it is a legitimate question to ask whether the EU Courts ought to 
                                                          
30  Case C-297/98 P, SCA Holding Ltd. v Commission, EU:C:2000:633, paragraphs 53–55. 
31  Case C-534/07 P, William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, 
EU:C:2009:505, paragraph 86. 
32  Case C-534/07 P, William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, 
EU:C:2009:505, paragraphs 87–88. 
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have a power to replace an assessment by a body with power to do so, unless it can be 
persuaded that that assessment is vitiated by some form of error? 
This last question may explain statements in the Court of Justice’s judgment in Kone 
to the effect that, when reviewing the legality of Commission decisions imposing fines 
for infringements of the EU competition rules, the EU Courts cannot encroach upon the 
Commission’s discretion by substituting their own assessment of complex economic 
circumstances but must show that the way in which the Commission reached its 
conclusions was legally unjustified. Such a demonstration consists in establishing 
whether the evidence relied upon was factually accurate, reliable and consistent, 
ascertaining whether that evidence contained all of the information that must be taken 
into account in the assessment of a complex situation and whether it was capable of 
substantiating the conclusions drawn therefrom.
33
  
On balance, there would appear to be scope to conclude that the General Court may 
be able to review a decision imposing a penalty without identifying an error in the 
decision. In practice, when the General Court alters a fine or penalty in the exercise of 
its unlimited jurisdiction, it almost invariably finds that the decision under review 






Reliance upon the Fining Guidelines 
 
The Court of Justice has held that the Commission’s Fining Guidelines set out rules of 
practice from which the latter may not depart in an individual case without giving 
reasons compatible with the principle of equal treatment. By adopting such rules and 
announcing that they will apply to the cases to which they relate, the Commission 
imposes a limit on the exercise of its discretion. It may thus depart from them in clearly 
identifiable circumstances only without running the risk of breaching general principles 
of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of legitimate expectations.
35
 In 
contrast, the EU Courts are not bound by the Fining Guidelines in the exercise of their 
unlimited jurisdiction, as that does not involve the application of a specific method in 
order to set fines but rather to a consideration as to whether the penalty may be justified 
by reference to the individual circumstances before them, taking into account all 
relevant matters of fact and of law.
36
 Accordingly, the Court of Justice upheld a finding 
by the General Court that a 10% increase for the duration of an infringement that had 
                                                          
33  Case C-510/11 P Kone Oyj v Commission, EU:C:2013:696, paragraphs 27–28. 
34  Case T-393/10, Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH, Westfälische Drahtindustrie Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH & 
Co. KG and Pampus Industriebeteiligungen GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, EU:T:2015:515, (under appeal C-
523/15 P), paragraphs 324 & 332. At paragraphs 346 to 358 of the judgment the General Court conducted its own 
assessment of the applicants’ circumstances by reference to the criteria at paragraphs 35 of the Fining Guidelines.  
35  Case T-27/10, AC Treuhand AG v Commission, EU:T:2014:59, paragraph 296, affirmed by Case C-194/14 P, AC 
Treuhand AG v Commission, EU:C:2015:717.  
36  Case C‑70/12 P, Quinn Barlo Ltd, Quinn Plastics NV, & Quinn Plastics GmbH v Commission, EU:T:2011:560, 
paragraph 53 ; Case T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi Srl v Commission, EU:C:2013:351, paragraph 266. Case C-
510/11 P Kone Oyj v Commission, EU:C:2013:696, paragraphs 28–29. 
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lasted 11 months and 28 days reflected its gravity, notwithstanding that the Fining 
Guidelines did not envisage an increase in respect of an infringement lasting less than 
12 months.
37
 In Romana Tabacchi the General Court more than halved a fine of €2.05M 
after having reached “an equitable assessment of all the circumstances of the case”.
38
 
This assessment included findings that the applicant was a small undertaking, that 
neither it nor its two shareholders (a married couple) were in a position to provide a 
bank guarantee to pay the original fine and that it had to sell assets to cover the risk of 
having to pay a fine of €1M, thereby reducing the value of its immovable assets below 
the level of the fine imposed by the Commission but staving off its being wound-up as a 
consequence of the capital maintenance requirements of Italian law. The General Court 
held that these circumstances could lead to the applicant’s liquidation and create 
significant economic repercussions: however, in reaching that conclusion it did not 
purport to apply what has since become paragraph 35 of the 2006 Fining Guidelines.
39
 
The assessment of ability to pay is a particularly good example of the exercise the 
EU Courts are enjoined to carry out in the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction since it 
requires an assessment of factual issues in respect of which it is reasonable to anticipate 
that informed opinion may differ. It is one thing to assess, by reference to the burden of 
proof and such materials as are before it, whether the Commission has shown that it was 
more likely than not that a director of a firm attended meetings at which competitors 
discussed prices. It is quite another to ascertain the upstream and downstream financial 
effects of a fine upon third parties, or the social impact of the possible liquidation of a 
business. Nonetheless the General Court has observed that the assessment of ability to 
pay is a practical application of the principle of proportionality in the field of sanctions 
for breaches of competition law.
40 
Paragraph 35 of the Fining Guidelines represents that, when setting fines for 
breaches of competition law, the Commission may, upon request and in exceptional 
cases, take account of an undertaking's ability to pay in a specific social and economic 
context. Such reductions are granted solely by reference to objective evidence that the 
imposition of the fine under the Guidelines would irretrievably jeopardise the economic 
viability of the undertaking concerned and cause its assets to lose all of their value. The 
reference to a specific social and economic context is, notably, to the consequences of 
the payment of the fine for employment and for the viability of other upstream and 
downstream undertakings.
41
 The total loss of the assets of an undertaking describes a 
situation where, as a result of the fine, the enterprise does not, or is unlikely to, continue 
trading; its assets are broken up and offered for sale separately and it is probable they 
will either not find a buyer or will be sold at a low price.
42
 
                                                          
37  Case T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi Srl v Commission, EU:C:2013:351, paragraph 266. 
38  Case T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi Srl v Commission, EU:T:2011:560, paragraph 284. 
39  Case T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi Srl v Commission, EU:T:2011:560, paragraphs 281–283. 
40  Case T-393/10, Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH, Westfälische Drahtindustrie Verwaltungsgesellschaft 
mbH & Co. KG and Pampus Industriebeteiligungen GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, EU:T:2015:515 (under 
appeal C-523/15 P), paragraph 296. 
41  Case T-400/09, Ecka Granulate et non ferrum Metallpulver v Commission, EU:T:2012:675, paragraph 99. 
42  Case T-400/09, Ecka Granulate et non ferrum Metallpulver v Commission, EU:T:2012:675, paragraph 98. 
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The application of these considerations requires a detailed assessment of the 
applicant’s financial circumstances and the social and economic context in which it 
operates. Applicants may request the EU Courts to carry out that assessment in the 
exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction.
43
 That assessment is made on the basis of the 
elements the applicant submits in support of the pleas advanced on its behalf, without 
reference to the margin of appreciation the Commission enjoyed when it made its 
assessment.
44
 Moreover, unlimited jurisdiction is to be exercised on the basis of the law 
and the facts as they stand at the time when the EU Court, not the Commission, takes its 
decision.
45
 One could anticipate that increasing the number of judges at the General 
Court from 28 to 56 in the course of the next four years will lead to a further reduction 
in the duration of proceedings in competition cases (already reduced from 60.6 months 
in 2009 to 41.6 months in 2016). However since the average duration of the written 
procedure in such actions was 7 months in 2016 and such cases usually involve 
complex factual and legal argument (as evidenced by the average length of the General 
Court’s judgments), most oral hearings take place approximately 24 months after the 
impugned decision has been adopted. A lot can happen in two years to change the 
circumstances of an economic sector, to say nothing of the ability of an individual 
undertaking to pay a fine. Thus in those cases where the applicant pleads inability to 
pay, the evidence may engage facts that arose after the Commission had taken the 
decision under review. As a consequence, the General Court may be required to 
adjudicate upon and assess complex financial, economic and social issues in the context 
of assessing a litigant’s ability to pay. This raises the interesting issue as to whether the 
EU Courts ought to conduct assessments of a similar character when asked to adjudicate 
on aspects of decisions imposing fines for breaches of the competition rules other than 
the size of the fine.
46
 
The General Court has been the target of criticism for allegedly showing undue 
deference to the Commission’s exercise of its various discretions under the Fining 
Guidelines and of reviewing Commission decisions in the exercise of its unlimited 
jurisdiction solely by reference to the Commission’s compliance with that instrument.
47
 
I do not propose to enter into that debate since it is not seriously contested that the 
Fining Guidelines may provide a source of inspiration for the EU Courts in the exercise 
of their unlimited jurisdiction. The issue is the legal justification for such reliance. 
                                                          
43  Case T-393/10, Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH, Westfälische Drahtindustrie Verwaltungsgesellschaft 
mbH & Co. KG and Pampus Industriebeteiligungen GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, EU:T:2015:515(under 
appeal C-523/15 P), paragraph 297. 
44  Case T-393/10, Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH, Westfälische Drahtindustrie Verwaltungsgesellschaft 
mbH & Co. KG and Pampus Industriebeteiligungen GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, EU:T:2015:515 (under 
appeal C-523/15 P), paragraph 301.  
45  Case T-393/10, Westfälische Drahtindustrie GmbH, Westfälische Drahtindustrie Verwaltungsgesellschaft mbH & 
Co. KG and Pampus Industriebeteiligungen GmbH & Co. KG v Commission, EU:T:2015:515 (under appeal C-
523/15 P), paragraph 302 and the case law there cited. 
46  Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, EU:C:2013:619, paragraphs 44–45, 
make it clear that “…the scope of the unlimited jurisdiction conferred by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003 is 
confined to the parts of such decisions imposing a fine or a periodic penalty payment.” 
47  Forrester, pp. 194–196. 
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The exercise of Union competences is subject to compliance with the general 
principles of EU law. Amongst these is the principle of equal treatment, expressed as 
precluding comparable situations from being treated differently and different situations 
from being treated identically,
48
 save where that difference in treatment can be 
objectively justified.
49
 In Quinn Barlo, the Court affirmed its case-law according to 
which unlimited jurisdiction cannot lead to a difference in treatment between 
undertakings that participated in an agreement contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. The 
General Court must thus give reasons when it departs from a method of calculation the 
Commission had relied upon to calculate a fine in respect of one party to an 
infringement as compared with other parties to that infringement.
50
 However this 
requirement applies only in circumstances where a number of parties are involved in the 
infringement. In Volkswagen v Commission the Court of Justice held that, in the 
exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction in proceedings that involve a single party, the 
Court of First Instance was entitled to recalculate the fine without being bound by the 
method the Commission had adopted.
51
 Moreover it should be emphasized that this line 
of authority does not prevent the General Court, in the exercise of its unlimited 
jurisdiction, from applying a different yardstick than that envisaged in the Fining 
Guidelines, but merely obliges it to give reasons why it decided not to follow them.
52
 It 
might thus be asked whether this requirement adds anything to the general obligation on 
the General Court to deliver reasoned judgments.
53
 
In any event, it is submitted that the principle of equal treatment is of limited 
application in the assessment of penalties. It is a core principle of sentencing policy
54
 
that penalties are appropriate to the individual circumstances of the infringement. Equal 
treatment thus applies only insofar as it requires the adjudicator to ensure that the 
individual circumstances of each undertaking are fully taken into account when 
imposing a fine. In practice, equal treatment operates so as to ensure that elements of 
anti-competitive activity as are common to the parties are punished in an identical 
manner. Reliance upon the Fining Guidelines on the ground that they ensure that any 
alteration of penalties in the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction complies with the 
principle of equal treatment thus appears, to be as a somewhat weak justification.  
Another principle which could justify recourse by the EU Courts to the Fining 
Guidelines is legal certainty, the requirements of which are to be observed strictly where 
the application of rules has financial consequences.
55
 Whilst the Commission’s 
                                                          
48  E.g. Case 106/83 Sermide SpA v Cassa Conguaglio Zucchero, EU:C:1984:394, paragraph 28.  
49  E.g. Case C-189/01 Jippes v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, EU:C:2001:420, paragraph 129; 
Case C-149/96 Portugal v Council, EU:C:1999:574, paragraph 91. 
50  Case C‑70/12 P, Quinn Barlo Ltd, Quinn Plastics NV, & Quinn Plastics GmbH v Commission, EU:C:2013:351 
paragraph 46 ; Case C-338/00 P, Volkswagen v Commission, EU:C:2003:473, paragraph 146. 
51  Case C-338/00 P Volkswagen v Commission, EU:C:2003:473, paragraph 147, referring to Case 322/81, Michelin v 
Commission, EU:C:1983:313, paragraph 111. 
52  For instance in Case C-441/11 P, Commission v Verhuizingen Coppens NV, EU:C:2012:778, paragraph 82, the 
Court of Justice gave no less than five reasons for reducing the fine. 
53  E.g. Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission, EU:C:2010:603, paragraphs 136 - 137. 
54  Joined Cases T-122/07 to T-124/07 Siemens Österreich and Others v Commission, paragraph 122 and the 
case-law there cited. 
55  E.g. Case 325/85, Ireland v Commission, EU:C:1987:546, paragraph 18. 
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adherence to its Fining Guidelines complies with that principle
56
 does this apply equally 
to the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction? In order to do justice in individual cases 
unlimited jurisdiction requires a court to take all relevant factual circumstances into 
account.
57
 It follows the Court may be invited to determine the amount of a fine by 
reference to matters that did not exist at the time the Commission adopted the decision 
under review. Nor is it an answer to refer to the obligation to give reasons for deviating 
from the Fining Guidelines, since legal certainty is directed primarily at ensuring that 
the law is certain and its application foreseeable.
58
 It seems to follow that reliance upon 
the Fining Guidelines in the exercise of unlimited jurisdiction may not be justified in 
reliance upon the principle of legal certainty. 
A general principle of EU law that appears to lean against reliance upon the Fining 
Guidelines is that of proportionality. Proportionality may be invoked in the context of 
the review of Commission decisions imposing fines on undertakings in two distinct 
ways. As a general principle of EU law, it may be relied upon to annul measures 
adopted by EU institutions that exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in 
order to attain legitimate objectives pursued thereby, where the least onerous of several 
appropriate measures was not adopted or where disadvantages consequential upon a 
decision are not disproportionate to the aims pursued thereby.
59
  Of greater relevance 
here is where proportionality is invoked as a rationale for, and essential element of, the 
exercise of unlimited jurisdiction.  
After referring to the general principles of EU law, Article 49(3) of the Charter and 
the Menarini judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, Advocate General 
Wathelet concluded in Telefonica that:  
 
“In procedures implementing competition rules, application of the principle of 
proportionality requires that the fine imposed on a company should not be 
disproportionate in relation to the objectives pursued by the Commission and that the 
amount of the fine should be proportionate to the infringement, account being duly 
taken, inter alia of the seriousness of the latter. To that end, the General Court must 
examine all the relevant facts, such as the conduct of the undertaking and the role it 
played in establishing the anti-competitive practice, its size, the value of the goods in 
question or the profit that it made as a result of the infringement committed, as well as 
the objective of deterrence pursued and the risks posed by offences of that kind to the 




                                                          
56  Case C-167/04 P, JCB Service v Commission, EU:C:2006:594, paragraphs 207– 09. 
57  Case C-534/07 P, William Prym GmbH & Co. KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co. KG v Commission 
EU:C:2009:505, paragraph 86. 
58  E.g. Case 325/85, Ireland v Commission, EU:C:1987:546, paragraph 18. 
59  See, inter alia, Case C-331/88, R. v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health, ex 
p. Fedesa, EU:C:1990:391, paragraph 13; Joined Cases C-133/93, C-300/93 and C-362/93 Crispoltoni v Fattoria 
Autonoma Tabacchi, EU:C:1994:364, paragraph 41; Case C-189/01 Jippes v Commission, EU:C:2001:420, 
paragraph 81. 
60  Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, EU:C:2013:619, Opinion of 
Wathelet AG, paragraph 117. 
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He continued by stating that “the General Court must exercise its unlimited 
jurisdiction fully when assessing the proportionality of the amount of the fine.”
 61
 
Moreover distinctly different outcomes may follow depending whether 
proportionality is applied in the context of a review of the legality of a decision or in the 
exercise of unlimited jurisdiction. The Romana Tabbacci judgment provides a 
remarkable example. The General Court dismissed the action to annul the decision by 
reason of the Commission’s alleged failure to take account of the applicant’s real ability 
to pay the fine at issue contrary to principle of proportionality on three grounds. First, it 
held that the Commission was not required, when determining the amount of the fine, to 
take into account the poor financial situation of an undertaking, as such a duty would 
afford an unjustified advantage to uncompetitive undertakings. Second, Article 23(2) of 
Regulation No 1/2003 did not require that, where several undertakings involved in the 
same infringement are fined, those imposed on SMEs must not be greater, as a 
percentage of turnover, than those imposed on larger undertakings. Third, since the 
applicant had not raised an issue as to its ability to pay during the administrative 
procedure, it could not impugn the legality of the Commission’s decision on that ground 
in its legal action.
62
 Yet, as we have already seen, the General Court reduced 
substantially the fine in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction by reliance upon a 
proportionality test that took particular account of the first and third of the grounds it 
had categorically rejected in the annulment action. 
In conclusion it seems that whilst the General Court is free to take the Fining 
Guidelines into account in the exercise of its unlimited jurisdiction and may hold that 
the Commission has acted unlawfully in failing to comply therewith, no principle of EU 
law requires the General Court to rely upon the Fining Guidelines in the exercise of its 














                                                          
61  Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España SAU v Commission, EU:C:2013:619, Opinion of 
Wathelet AG, paragraph 118 (emphasis in original). 
62  Case T-11/06, Romana Tabacchi Srl v Commission, EU:T:2011:560, paragraphs 255 - 264. 
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SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE UNLIMITED JURISDICTION OF 






This contribution examines three aspects of the law pertaining to the EU Courts’ 
exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction with regard to fines and penalties: the judicial 
character of unlimited jurisdiction and its consequences for litigants; the autonomous 
character of unlimited jurisdiction and its relationship to the action for annulment and 
the rationale by which the EU Courts may have recourse to the Commission’s Fining 
Guidelines in, exercise of their unlimited jurisdiction. 
